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JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS IN MOORE V. ABBOTT
Andrew C. Helman*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Moore v. Abbott,1 a divided Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law
Court, held that a three-member panel organized by the Attorney General to investigate
alleged misconduct by prosecutors and law enforcement officers did not constitute an
“agency” or “public official” under Maine’s Freedom of Access Act2 (FOAA).3
Therefore, the panel did not have to release records compiled during its review of the
investigation and prosecution of Dennis Dechaine, who was convicted for the 1988
murder of Sarah Cherry.4 Justice Alexander, writing for the majority, applied a fourpart test looking to whether the panel was the functional equivalent of a government
agency and concluded that it was not, which meant its records could be kept
confidential.5 Justice Levy, joined in his dissent by Justice Mead, characterized the
facts differently and applied a broader version of the functional equivalency test to
reach the opposite conclusion: the panel was acting as the functional equivalent of a
government agency.6 However, Justice Levy’s dissent did not go so far as to assert that
the records should be public; rather, he concluded that the panel acted as an agency
under the FOAA, but that further analysis must be done to determine whether other
statutory provisions prevent disclosure.7
There are several issues in the Moore decision. Most significantly, the majority
opinion undermined the Maine Legislature’s policy favoring disclosure of government
records. The Law Court previously noted that the FOAA’s purpose “is to open public
proceedings and require that public actions and records be available to the public,”8 a
result not achieved here. Additionally, the majority and dissenting opinions did not
share the same understanding of the historical facts. For example, it is unclear from
the majority and dissenting opinions whether the panel had access to the entire
Dechaine file, including photographs of the victim designated confidential by the
Maine Legislature, or whether it only had access to portions already available for

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Maine School of Law. I would like to thank my wife, Sara.
Your love, support, and patience through school mean more than I can say here. Additionally, I would like
to thank Professor Melvyn Zarr. Your insight, advice, and scissors helped make this Note possible. Thank
you for reading my drafts.
1. 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980 (3-2 decision).
2. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401-412 (1989 & Supp. 2008).
3. Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶ 1, 952 A.2d at 981.
4. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 952 A.2d at 981. See also State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 131 (Me. 1990); State v.
Dechaine, 630 A.2d 234 (Me. 1993) (providing substantial procedural history and review of the evidentiary
record regarding Dechaine’s conviction).
5. Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶¶ 15-21, 952 A.2d at 984-85.
6. Id. ¶ 22, 952 A.2d at 985 (Levy, J., dissenting).
7. Id. ¶ 40, 952 A.2d at 989-90.
8. Town of Burlington v. Hosp. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 2001 ME 59, ¶ 13, 769 A.2d 857, 861.
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public inspection.9 Consequently, the majority and dissenting opinions turned to
different versions of the law; the majority adhered to a narrow view of the functional
equivalency test, while the dissent applied a broader version that is in sync with the
way several other jurisdictions supplement their freedom of access laws.10 Ultimately,
the dissent’s analysis better effectuated the legislature’s policy of openness; therefore,
the Law Court should adopt that policy in the future.
This controversy before the court in Moore is part of a long history of cases
brought by Dechaine and his supporters in an effort to secure a new trial.11 This Note
takes no position on the underlying controversy, but understanding the historical and
procedural context is important to grasp the Law Court’s decision. Accordingly, the
rest of the Introduction describes Moore’s efforts in support of Dechaine to the extent
necessary. In addition, Part II provides readers with a brief background on the FOAA,
as it is currently interpreted by the court. While Moore focused on access to public
records, the majority and dissenting opinions turned to the FOAA’s treatment of public
proceedings for guidance as well as to reconcile of an important case applying the
FOAA to public proceedings, Lewiston Daily Sun v. City of Auburn.12 The majority
distinguished Lewiston Daily Sun, whereas the dissent persuasively incorporated the
decision’s reasoning into its analysis under the functional equivalency test.13 After
that, Part III describes the justices’ competing versions of the facts in Moore and
subsequently, how the law should be applied. From there, Part IV argues that the court
should adopt the dissent’s analysis of the law and suggests that remanding would have
been a useful way to gain a better understanding of the underlying facts. However, a
legislative solution is also needed because the majority’s opinion undermined the
Maine Legislature’s intent to favor openness and disclosure. As a result, Part V
provides sample statutory language, offering policy-makers either a broad or narrow
approach, as well as a suggestion for a corresponding amendment to the FOAA’s
definition of public proceedings.
A. Moore’s Public Campaign
The case arises out of a series of efforts by James P. Moore, a long-time supporter
of Dechaine, to secure a new trial for Dechaine based on his belief that there was
misconduct by law enforcement investigators and prosecutors in the Attorney
General’s Office.14 Moore, a retired Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Agent, detailed

9. Compare Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶ 18, 952 A.2d at 985 (characterizing the records as public), with
Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶ 25, 952 A.2d at 986 (Levy, J., dissenting) (characterizing a portion of the records
as confidential).
10. See generally Moore, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980.
11. See, e.g., State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130 (Me. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 857 (1990); State v.
Dechaine, 630 A.2d 234, 235 (Me. 1993) (denying a motion for a new trial); State v. Dechaine, 644 A.2d
458, 458 (Me. 1994) (affirming an order requiring defense counsel to return to the state exhibits wrongly
given to defense counsel after the trial); Dechaine v. State, KNOSC-CR-95-380 (Me. Super. Ct., Kno. Cty.,
Jan. 9, 1999) (Marden, J.) (dismissing a motion for post-conviction review); Dechaine v. Warden, No. 00123-P-H, 2000 WL 1183165 (D. Me. July 28, 2000) (denying a writ of habeas corpus).
12. 544 A.2d 335 (Me. 1988).
13. Compare Moore, 2008 ME 10, ¶ 19, 952 A.2d at 985 (majority opinion), with Moore, 2008 ME
100, ¶ 33, 952 A.2d at 988 (Levy, J., dissenting).
14. Id. ¶ 3, 952 A.2d at 982 (majority opinion).
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his accusations of misconduct in three books and a report written to support the efforts
of Trial & Error—a group of Dechaine supporters with whom Moore is associated.15
For example, Moore alleged that investigators altered their notes, that the state
destroyed evidence during post-conviction litigation, and that prosecutors ignored
other possible suspects.16 Consequently, Moore sought the records of Dechaine’s
investigation and prosecution from the Maine State Police and Attorney General’s
Office to support his contention that Dechaine was wrongly imprisoned and needed a
new trial.17 Along the way, Moore and Trial & Error attracted the support of several
Maine residents, with local chapters of Trial & Error holding meetings.18 However,
they have been largely unsuccessful in their pursuit of a new trial through appellate and
federal review.19
In response to Moore’s public campaign, the Maine Legislature enacted a private
and special law proposed by then-Sen. John Martin (D-Aroostook County) aimed at
making the Dechaine investigation and prosecution records public.20 According to the
official statement of legislative intent, the legislature intended to exempt all Dechaine
records, except for photographs of the victim, from the operation of an earlier law21
that generally declared all investigative records created before July 1, 1995, to be
confidential.22 Now, under Sen. Martin’s bill, records relating to the investigation of
Cherry’s death are governed by a statute23 that provides for a general prohibition
against disclosure of intelligence and investigative records created after July 1, 1995,
unless they fall into certain exceptions that allow for disclosure.24 That means the
Attorney General’s Office keeps the files confidential unless, for example, releasing
them would not interfere with an investigation.

15. See JAMES P. MOORE, HUMAN SACRIFICE (2002); JAMES P. MOORE, HUMAN SACRIFICE: ON THE
ALTAR OF INJUSTICE (2006) (an updated and expanded version of HUMAN SACRIFICE); James P. Moore,
Evidence of Misconduct by Officials of the State of Maine in connection with the Investigation and
Prosecution of Dennis Dechaine for the 1988 murder of Sarah Cherry (2008),
http://www.trialanderrordennis.org/pdfs/report.pdf [hereinafter Moore, Evidence of Misconduct].
16. See generally Moore, Evidence of Misconduct, supra note 15.
17. See JAMES P. MOORE, HUMAN SACRIFICE (2002); JAMES P. MOORE, HUMAN SACRIFICE: ON THE
ALTAR OF INJUSTICE (2006) (an updated and expanded version of HUMAN SACRIFICE); Moore, Evidence
of Misconduct, supra note 15.
See Trial & Error, Dennis Dechaine is Innocent,
http://www.trialanderrordennis.org (“Dechaine’s supporters ask only for a new trial.”).
18. See, e.g., Letter from Jon Lund, former Attorney General, State of Maine, to Bangor Daily News
Editorials (unpublished) (Feb. 20, 2008), available at http://www.trialanderrordennis.org/documents/
lundletter.html. For information on meetings, see http://www.trialanderrordennis.org/events.shtml.
19. See, e.g., State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 130 (Me. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 857 (1990); State
v. Dechaine, 630 A.2d 234, 235 (Me. 1993) (denying a motion for a new trial); Dechaine v. State, KNOSCCR-95-380 (Me. Super. Ct., Kno. Cty., Jan. 9, 1999) (Marden, J.) (dismissing a motion for post-conviction
review); Dechaine v. Warden, No. 00-123-P-H, 2000 WL 1183165, at *1 (D. Me. July 28, 2000) (denying
a writ of habeas corpus).
20. P. & S.L. 2003, ch. 18; L.D. 1097 (121st Legis. 2003) (“An Act To Release the Records of the
Attorney General and the Maine State Police Regarding the Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Dennis
Dechaine”). See also Committee File for L.D. 1097 (121st Legis. 2003), Joint Standing Committee on
Judiciary.
21. P.L. 1993, ch. 719, § 11.
22. P. & S.L. 2003, ch. 18; L.D. 1097 (121st Legis. 2003).
23. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 614 (2006).
24. P. & S.L. 2003, ch. 18; L.D. 1097 (121st Legis. 2003).
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Shortly after the enactment of Sen. Martin’s bill, Moore filed a public records
request with the Maine State Police and received “a large number of documents
relating to the State’s investigation.”25 However, Moore believed that the Maine State
Police withheld key documents from him, such as a canine incident report.26 Moore
then turned to the Superior Court for relief, where he argued that the Maine State
Police illegally withheld part of the file.27 However, reviewing the agency action de
novo under the FOAA, the Superior Court concluded that Sen. Martin’s bill allowed
disclosure of the entire file except for photographs of the victim, and that the Maine
State Police had met its obligation to do so.28 Justice Crowley said much of the
evidence Moore submitted to support his argument that the Maine State Police denied
his records request “is based on either inferences he draws from the documents he has
reviewed or on representations made by third parties.”29 Essentially, the court said, “he
has failed to establish that the documents and records he seeks do, in fact, exist.” 30
B. The Independent Review
Meanwhile, Attorney General G. Steven Rowe, who was not in office during
Dechaine’s trial, grew concerned that Moore’s persistent allegations would undermine
public confidence in the integrity of his office and Maine’s law enforcement officers.31
Rowe had no reason to believe the allegations were true,32 but he wanted an effective
way for his office to address them and believed there was “no agency or official within
state government” tasked with investigating this type of misconduct.33 Accordingly,
Rowe asked three “respected and experienced members of the Maine Bar to
independently review the Dechaine prosecution.”34 However, lacking specific legal
authority authorizing or prohibiting such a review, Rowe and his staff asked “the
individuals whether, as a service to the public, they would be willing to voluntarily
undertake the review.”35
Thus, in October 2004, Rowe asked Charles H. Abbott, Esq., Marvin H. Glazier,
Esq., and Hon. Eugene W. Beaulieu to review the investigation and prosecution of
Dechaine, focusing specifically on Moore’s accusations.36 Rowe sought individuals
“of unquestionable integrity” who have “no ties to the Office of the Attorney General
or to any other state agency, and have the necessary knowledge and experience to

25. Moore v. Poulin, CUMAP-04-38, 2004 WL 3196330, at *1 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Dec. 27,
2004) (Crowley, J.).
26. Id. at *1 n.2. It is not clear why Moore believed the canine reports were critically important.
27. Id. at *1. While the action was pending, the State Police contacted two former investigators, one
of whom “produced personal notebooks as well as micro-cassettes relating to the investigation.” Id.
28. Id. at *2.
29. Id. at *3.
30. Id. at *4.
31. Appendix to Brief of Appellant at pt. 9, Moore v. Abbott, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980 (No. CUM07-467).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. pt. 6.
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thoroughly investigate and evaluate the relevant evidence.”37 Rowe advised them that
the “guilt or innocence of Mr. Dechaine is for the courts,” and asked them to investigate the following accusations: that law enforcement officers altered their notes and
reports to attribute incriminating statements to Dechaine; that prosecutors misled the
jury regarding Cherry’s time of death; that information about an alternative suspect was
withheld from defense counsel; that a rape kit was inappropriately destroyed in 1992,
several years after the conviction; and, that prosecutors inappropriately failed to tell
the court and defense counsel about a consultant’s opinion of the reliability of DNA
tests conducted in 1993.38 In his charging letter, Rowe asked the panel to “conduct an
independent and impartial review of these allegations and provide to me a report of
your findings, which will be made public.”39 He pledged the complete cooperation of
his office and assured them that “[s]tate investigative and prosecutorial files regarding
this case are public documents . . . and will be made available for your review and
copying.”40 Additionally, he said that investigators and prosecutors of Dechaine would
be available for interviews.41
It is not entirely clear from the Moore opinion or the Superior Court order in this
case specifically what records Moore believed the panel reviewed, created, or
maintained during its two-year review.42 Additionally, this author requested from a
panel member a description of the records at issue in Moore, not a full disclosure, but
this request was denied.43 However, several letters, an affidavit, and the panel’s report,
all included in the Appendix to the briefs, show that the panel indeed interviewed
investigators and prosecutors.44 The panel also reviewed documents Justice Beaulieu
requested from the Attorney General’s Office, as well as Dechaine’s trial transcript,
police reports, the autopsy report, pleadings filed in Moore’s earlier FOAA action
against the Maine State Police, affidavits of a Dechaine supporter and two of his
lawyers, and an affidavit filed by Hon. Joseph H. Field.45 Additionally, the report said
“[Rowe] made available to us [his] office’s entire file in this matter.”46 However, it is
not clear whether the panel’s access to the Attorney General’s file included the
photographs of the victim, which is a point of contention between the majority and
dissenting justices in the Moore opinion.
After the panel issued its report in August 2006, telling Rowe that “none of the
allegations set forth to us in your letter . . . have any substantive merit,” Moore sent a
letter purporting to be a public records request to Abbott, Glazier, Beaulieu, and
Rowe.47 In response, the Attorney General’s Office provided Moore with copies of its

37. Id. pt. 9.
38. Id. pt. 6.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See generally Moore v. Abbott, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980; Appendix to Brief of Appellant,
supra note 31, at pt. 2.
43. Letter from Seth D. Harrow, Counsel to Marvin Glazier, Vafiades, Brountas & Kominsky, LLP, to
Andrew C. Helman, (Oct. 27, 2008) (on file with author).
44. See Appendix to Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at pt. 8.
45. See id. pt. 7.
46. Id. pt. 8.
47. Id. pt. 5.
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correspondence to the panel and a letter to a retired detective that was written to
schedule an interview.48 However, the panel members ignored Moore’s request.49
C. The Lawsuit Commences
On September 20, 2006, Moore named Abbott, Beaulieu, and Glazier as
defendants in an action appealing the panel’s apparent denial of the records request.50
Moore argued that the failure to respond to his request for “files, records and reports
of the commission” amounted to an unlawful denial of his public records request.51 In
response, Abbott, Glazier, and Beaulieu contended “that they did not constitute a State
agency or public official subject to the requirements of the [FOAA].”52 After
dispensing with preliminary matters,53 Justice Crowley issued an order on July 16,
2007, concluding that the panel was not the functional equivalent of a state agency;
therefore, its records did not have to be disclosed.54 The functional equivalency test
adopted by the Law Court supplements the FOAA, which lacks a definition for
“agency” or “public official.”55 The test measures whether an entity acted like an
agency or official based on four factors: (1) whether the entity performed a
governmental function; (2) whether the government funded the entity; (3) the extent
of government control over the entity; and (4) whether it was created by private or
legislative action.56 Justice Crowley found that all four factors of the functional
equivalency test weighed against finding the panel acted as a state agency and
characterized its work as that of a public interest group outside of government.57 The
order did not include factual findings or mention the records requested, except to say:
“Petitioner made an [sic] FOAA request for access to files, records and reports
compiled during Respondents’ independent review.”58 Subsequently, Moore appealed;
the Law Court, dividing 3-to-2, affirmed.59 However, the court’s decision raised a

48. Brief of Appellant at 5, Moore, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980 (No. CUM-07-467).
49. Appendix to Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at pt. 5. Moore sent two requests to the panel
members, with the second telling them he planned to treat their lack of a response as a denial under the
FOAA; neither garnered a response. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶ 7, 952 A.2d at 983.
53. Abbott, Beaulieu, and Glazier filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Moore had missed the
deadline for appeal under the FOAA, but the Superior Court noted that the deadline only applies when an
agency sends a written notice of denial. See Moore v. Abbott, CUMAP-06-49 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty.,
Mar. 22, 2007) (Crowley, J.). Otherwise, the appeal is governed by Rule 80C of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides Moore with a six-month window in which to file an appeal under title 5, section
11002(3) of the Maine Revised Statutes. Id. While the standards of review are different between Rule 80C
and the FOAA, the Superior Court and Law Court engaged in a de novo review under the FOAA.
54. Appendix to Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at pt. 2.
55. See id. at pt. 3. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(3) (1989 & Supp. 2008).
56. Appendix to Brief of Appellant, supra note 31, at pt. 2.
57. Id. at pt. 4. In addition, Justice Crowley said there was no public funding; the Attorney General’s
Office exerted little, if any, control over the panel, with the only control being in the selection of the
members and describing their charge; and, the panel was created by Rowe’s private action, as opposed to
legislative action. Id.
58. Id. at pt. 2.
59. Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶ 1, 952 A.2d at 981.
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question: whether the majority’s conclusion supports the Maine Legislature’s policy
favoring openness and disclosure?
II. THE MECHANICS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FOAA
A. The Mechanics
Accessing government records is nothing new. Today, every state has laws
declaring that, in general, government records and meetings are open to the public.60
The Maine Legislature enacted the FOAA in 195961 and amended it on several
occasions, including a substantial overhaul in 1975.62 Notably, in the first section of
the statute, the legislature declared its intent that government action and records be
open to public inspection and that the FOAA “be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies as contained in the declaration of
legislative intent.”63 As a corollary, the Law Court strictly construes exceptions to the
FOAA.64
The first step to understanding when a record is “public” and subject to disclosure
begins with the definition of “public record,” which consists of three elements. The
information sought must be (1) “written, printed or graphic matter” or electronic data
in the (2) “possession or custody of an agency or public official” of the state or a
political subdivision that was (3) “received or prepared in connection with the
transaction of public or governmental business or contains information relating to the
transaction of public or governmental business.”65 However, there are fifteen
categorical exceptions, including records designated confidential by statute,66 which,
for example, included the Dechaine files before Sen. Martin’s bill was enacted.67
Generally, every person has the right to inspect and copy public records during the
normal business hours of the agency or official possessing it.68 No precise timetable
is outlined in the statute for responding to a request, unless the agency plans to deny
it, in which case the agency has five working days to issue a denial.69 If a denial is
issued, a five-working-day window is then triggered for a requestor to appeal the
agency’s decision to the Superior Court.70 When agencies and officials plan to grant

60. See generally Open Government Guide, http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php (providing a state-bystate look at sunshine laws).
61. P.L. 1959, ch. 219 (“An Act Pertaining to Freedom of Access to Public Records and Proceedings”).
62. See generally Anne C. Lucey, Comment, A Section-By-Section Analysis of Maine’s Freedom of
Access Act, 43 ME. L. REV. 169 (1991).
63. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 (1989).
64. Cyr v. Madawaska Sch. Dep’t, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 8, 916 A.2d 967, 970.
65. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(3) (1989 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). See also Lucey,
supra note 62, at 184.
66. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(3)(A) (1989 & Supp. 2008). For a relevant example of a record
designated confidential by statute, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 614 (2006), which generally makes
law enforcement records created after 1995 confidential, unless they fall into certain categories.
Additionally, the Maine Legislature maintains a searchable database of exceptions to the FOAA, available
at http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/foa/.
67. P. & S.L. 2003, ch. 18; L.D. 1097 (121st Legis. 2003).
68. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1989 & Supp. 2008).
69. Id. § 409(1).
70. Id.
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a FOAA request, they are supposed to acknowledge the request within a reasonable
period of time.71 The Superior Court reviews appeals under the FOAA de novo and
will enter an order compelling disclosure if the denial was unjust or for an improper
cause;72 the court may assess a civil penalty up to $500 for willful violations of the
FOAA.73 As a signal of the importance the Maine Legislature places on disclosure,
appeals under this section are to be placed ahead of all other actions on the Superior
Court docket, except for “writs of habeas corpus or actions brought by the State against
individuals.”74
Similarly, public proceedings are defined in the FOAA to include the business of
the legislature and its subcommittees—state boards, commissions, and boards of
trustees of the state universities; municipal, county, and school boards—and any
advisory organization “established, authorized or organized by law or resolve or by
Executive Order.”75 Generally, members of the public shall be allowed to attend,76
record, or broadcast public proceedings;77 however, a body or agency may by a threefifths, on-the-record vote go into executive session to discuss, for example, personnel
matters, contractual negotiations, or certain legal issues with counsel.78 All final action
must be taken in public,79 and if a body takes a final action in secret, a person may
appeal to the Superior Court, which after a trial de novo shall nullify the action if it
determines it was taken illegally.80 An appeal of an agency decision allegedly
occurring in an illegal executive session is fast-tracked similar to those for denials of
public records requests.81
B. Interpreting the FOAA
Despite the seemingly clear statutory language, application of these provisions has
not been without difficulty, as Moore shows. Notably, especially in the context of the
Moore decision, is the absence of a definition of “agency” or “public official.” Hence,
the Law Court relies on a test that looks to whether an entity is acting as the functional
equivalent of an official or agency.82 The Law Court first used the functional
equivalency test in Town of Burlington v. Hosp. Admin. Dist. No. 1,83 an action brought
by Burlington to compel a legislatively created hospital district to disclose its records.84
On appeal by the hospital district, the Law Court looked to the function the hospital
district performed and affirmed the Superior Court’s conclusion that some of the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. § 408(1).
Id. § 409(1).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 410 (1989).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 409(1) (1989 & Supp. 2008).
Id. § 402(2).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 403 (1989).
Id. § 404.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 405 (1989 & Supp. 2008).
Id. § 405(2).
Id. § 409(2).
Id.
See, e.g., Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶ 11, 952 A.2d at 983.
2001 ME 59, ¶ 16, 769 A.2d 857, 862-63.
Id. ¶ 1, 769 A.2d at 859.
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records had to be disclosed.85 In so doing, the Law Court relied on a compilation of
criteria used by several jurisdictions when determining whether an entity is a public
agency or official for the purposes of the FOAA.86 The four factors established in
Town of Burlington are: “(1) whether the entity is performing a governmental
function; (2) whether the funding of the entity is governmental; (3) the extent of
governmental involvement or control; and (4) whether the entity was created by private
or legislative action.”87 The factors are to be weighed, rather than requiring strict
adherence to all of them.88
In adopting this test, the Law Court joined several other jurisdictions using
variations of the criteria.89 However, in so doing, the Law Court changed the fourth
criterion slightly, but from the standpoint of the Moore decision, significantly. In
Town of Burlington, the Law Court characterized the fourth criterion as whether
private or legislative action created the entity,90 while other jurisdictions look more
broadly to whether government created the entity.91 The effect, in Moore, leaves out
entities created by Maine’s constitutional officers, such as the Attorney General, who
may, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, “exercise all such power and authority
as public interests may from time to time require, and may institute, conduct, and
maintain all such suits and proceedings as he deems necessary for the enforcement of
the laws of the states, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights.”92
Similarly, the public proceedings portion of the FOAA has also been subject to
interpretation by the Law Court. In Lewiston Daily Sun, the Law Court held that an
investigatory committee convened by Auburn’s mayor had to conduct its meetings in
open, even though the FOAA did not specifically mention “committees” in its
definition section.93 The court reasoned that the “extensive links between the
committee and Auburn’s city council and mayor” were sufficient for the committee to
fall within the ambit of the Legislature’s intent that meetings of municipal boards be
open to the public.94 The Law Court, when describing the linkages, said that the
mayor, acting at the council’s direction, convened the panel, appointed its members,
gave it a charge, and told it to investigate whomever it wanted, but suggested it
question a few particular people.95 Additionally, the Law Court said that if the city

85. Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 769 A.2d at 862-64.
86. Id. ¶ 16, 769 A.2d at 862. See also generally Conn. Humane Soc’y v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n,
591 A.2d 395 (Conn. 1991); Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, 974 P.2d 886 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999); Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Consol. Rail Corp., 580 F. Supp. 777 (D.D.C. 1984).
87. Town of Burlington, 2001 ME 59, ¶ 16, 769 A.2d at 863.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Conn. Humane Soc’y, 591 A.2d at 397; Telford, 974 P.2d at 893-95 (providing an
explanation and examples of the development of the functional equivalency test). See also Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 580 F. Supp. at 778-79 (providing an earlier example of the functional equivalency test
in the federal courts).
90. Town of Burlington, 2001 ME 59, ¶ 16, 769 A.2d at 863.
91. Conn. Humane Soc’y, 591 A.2d at 397; Telford, 974 P.2d at 893-95.
92. Withee v. Lane & Libby Fisheries Co., 120 Me. 121, 123, 113 A. 22, 23 (1921) (internal quotations
omitted). See also Lund ex rel. Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d 554, 558 (Me. 1973) (citing Withee approvingly);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Attorney Gen., 558 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Me. 1989).
93. Lewiston Daily Sun, Inc. v. City of Auburn, 544 A.2d 335, 336-37 (Me. 1988).
94. Id. at 338.
95. Id.
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council had conducted the investigation, its meetings would have been required to be
held openly.96 Accordingly, “[t]he council cannot avoid that requirement through its
decision to delegate that investigatory function to another entity . . . especially when
as here that specially created entity maintains substantial and continuing links with the
parent council.”97 As noted below in Part III, this issue became prominent in Moore
because the dissent incorporated Lewiston Daily Sun’s linkages analysis into its
discussion of the extent of government involvement and control with the panel.
III. THE MOORE V. ABBOTT DECISION
A. The Arguments
On appeal in Moore v. Abbott,98 Moore, a pro se litigant, argued that the Superior
Court erred in its application of the four-factor functional equivalency test and that
each factor favored a conclusion that the panel acted as the functional equivalent of a
government agency.99 Particularly relevant to the court’s disagreement on whether the
fourth factor is limited to legislatively created entities, Moore contended that Rowe’s
action as a constitutional officer cannot be interpreted to be that of a private citizen
because private citizens lack the power to command government resources and make
them available for an independent review.100 Supporting Moore, the Maine Civil
Liberties Union (MCLU) filed an amicus brief arguing that, under two tracks of
analysis, the records of the panel would be subject to the FOAA’s disclosure
provisions. First, the MCLU argued the panel was also the functional equivalent of a
state agency and argued in favor of a broader test for the fourth factor, similar to
Moore.101 The MCLU reasoned, “action by the Attorney General is just as much a
state action as action by the Legislature.”102 Second, the MCLU argued the panel
would satisfy a test that looks to the linkages between an advisory panel and the office
that created it, as in Lewiston Daily Sun.103 However, the majority declined to adopt
the MCLU’s view, which suggested extending the application of Lewiston Daily Sun

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980.
99. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 48, at 7. Addressing the first factor, whether the panel
performed a governmental function, Moore argued the allegations the panel reviewed would constitute
chargeable offenses under Maine law ranging from “Official Oppression to Perjury,” and that investigating
crimes is a government function the Legislature designated to the attorney general’s office. Id. at 8-9. For
second factor, whether the government provided funding, Moore argued the publicly financed resources
of the attorney general’s office benefitted the outside investigation through photocopying documents and
making employees available to be interviewed. Id. at 15. For the third factor, which examines the extent
of government control over the entity, Moore argued that the limitations placed on the scope of the panel’s
review constituted substantial government involvement and control over its work, because it was
specifically not tasked to express an opinion on Dechaine’s guilt or innocence, and was required by the
terms of the charge to provide a written report. Id. at 16.
100. See id. at 17-18.
101. Brief of Amicus Curiae Maine Civil Liberties Union at 13-15, Moore, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980
(No. CUM-07-467).
102. Id. at 15.
103. Id. at 11.
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beyond public proceedings as an alternative to the functional equivalency test in the
context of public records.
In response, Abbott, Beaulieu, and Glazier contended that all four factors
supported the Superior Court’s conclusion that they were not acting as a government
agency for the purpose of the FOAA and that Lewiston Daily Sun was inapplicable.104
Essentially, they argued the panel functioned analogously to a public interest watchdog
group, as opposed to a government entity.105 Additionally, they argued that Lewiston
Daily Sun did not apply because that decision focused on public proceedings as
opposed to public records, demonstrated closer linkages between the board and the
charging agency, and relied, in part, on the city council’s legislative authorization to
create the board.106
B. The Court’s Analysis of the Four Factors
Ultimately, in a three-to-two majority decision, the Law Court affirmed the
Superior Court’s application of the four-factor functional equivalency test in a de novo
review and held the panel could keep its records confidential because it was not an
agency under the FOAA.107 Instead, the majority held that the panel acted similarly to
many private groups providing “advice on a wide range of topics from ways to cut
costs and improve efficiency, to ways to improve the economy, to recommendations
for appointment of qualified individuals to public positions.”108 However, the majority
reached its conclusion without addressing what records, if any, the panel generated,
created, or maintained, or how they differed from records Moore previously obtained
after the Maine Legislature enacted Sen. Martin’s bill—a significant point because the
court could have remanded for further factual findings to determine the nature of the

104. Abbott was represented separately from Glazier and Beaulieu, but their arguments are, for the most
part, substantially the same. See generally Brief of Respondent Charles Abbott, Esq., Moore, 2008 ME
100, 952 A.2d 980 (No. CUM-07-467); Reply Brief of Respondent Charles Abbott, Esq., Moore, 2008 ME
100, 952 A.2d 980 (No. CUM-07-467); Brief of Respondents Honorable Eugene Beaulieu and Marvin
Glazier, Esq., Moore, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980 (No. CUM-07-467); Reply Brief of Respondents
Honorable Eugene Beaulieu and Marvin Glazier, Esq., Moore, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980 (No. CUM-07467).
105. Brief of Respondents Honorable Eugene Beaulieu and Marvin Glazier, Esq., supra note 104, at 7.
For the first factor, Abbott argued that the review could not be a government function because “there was
no mechanism for such a function” within Maine’s government. Brief of Respondent Charles Abbott, Esq.,
supra note 104, at 7. For the government funding factor, Abbott, Beaulieu, and Glazier argued the panel
bore the cost of all out-of-pocket expenses on its own. Id. at 8; Brief of Respondents Honorable Eugene
Beaulieu and Marvin Glazier, Esq., supra note 104, at 7. For the government control factor, they argued
the “only level of control the Attorney General exercised . . . was in choosing the three Respondents . . . and
then describing the matter he wished the Respondents to investigate.” Id. at 8. For the fourth factor,
whether the panel was created by private or legislative action, they argued Rowe made a “private decision
to have them review his office’s past work on the murder case in question,” id. at 8-9, and “the fact that
Respondents were asked to serve by a constitutional officer, whose constitutional duties are ordained by
both Constitution and statute does not make Respondents or their service, a legislative creation,” Brief of
Respondent Charles Abbott, Esq., supra note 104, at 9.
106. See Reply Brief of Respondents Honorable Eugene Beaulieu and Marvin Glazier, Esq., supra note
104, at 3-4; Reply Brief of Respondent Charles Abbott, Esq., supra note 104, at 4-6.
107. See Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶ 1, 952 A.2d at 981.
108. Id. ¶ 13, 952 A.2d at 984.
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records at issue.109 In contrast, the dissent argued that the majority misapplied the four
factors, and then applied a broader version of the fourth factor—whether the panel was
created by government as opposed to private or legislative action—to conclude the
panel was the functional equivalent of a government agency.110 The dissent contended
that “a broader understanding of the fourth criterion is necessary because the Freedom
of Access Act is not restricted to entities created by legislation.”111
Addressing the first factor, whether the panel performed a governmental function,
the majority concluded the panel acted like a group of private citizens.112 In support
of this conclusion, the majority contended that the panel’s advice was nonbinding; the
group lacked authority to charge, prosecute or sanction; and, the attorney general could
treat the report as he wished.113 Accordingly, the court summarized its conclusion by
saying:
A person or entity, acting without statutory authority or state support, who provides
nonbinding advice to a state agency or state official, even on a matter that may be of
some significance, does not, by providing that nonbinding advice, become an agent
of government performing a governmental function for purposes of application of the
Freedom of Access Act.114

Looking more broadly, the majority also said general state government practice has not
treated “such informal advisory groups, either individually or collectively as ‘an
agency or public official’ subject” to the FOAA.115 To support this conclusion, the
majority turned to the FOAA’s definition of public proceedings, which includes the
business of any advisory organization established by law, resolve, or executive order.116
The panel was “not in the categories listed in the law, and it was not performing a
governmental function to subject it to the law.”117
In contrast, the dissent concluded that the heart of the panel’s work was a
traditional government function because it was an investigation into allegations of
prosecutorial and law enforcement misconduct.118 The dissent cited two Maine cases
for the proposition that an investigation by an outside source can be considered to be
a public function, and then argued that the majority minimized several facts to reach
its conclusion.119 For example, the dissent pointed to Rowe’s conclusion that the
investigation could not have been completed internally.120 Further supporting this
view, the dissent said the Attorney General “not only provided the panel access to his
entire file in the matter, portions of which are explicitly designated confidential by the

109. See generally Moore, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980.
110. Id. ¶¶ 22-40, 952 A.2d at 985-90 (Levy, J., dissenting).
111. Id. ¶ 36, 952 A.2d at 989.
112. Id. ¶ 15, 952 A.2d at 984 (majority opinion).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. ¶ 16, 952 A.2d at 984.
116. Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(2)(F) (Supp. 2008)).
117. Id.
118. Id. ¶ 24, 952 A.2d at 986 (Levy, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (citing Cyr, 2007 ME 28, ¶¶ 3-4, 12, 916 A.2d at 969, 971; Lewiston Daily Sun, 544 A.2d at
335-36).
120. Id. ¶ 25, 952 A.2d at 986.
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Legislature, but also ordered personnel involved in the Dechaine prosecution to
cooperate in the panel’s investigation.”121
In addition, the dissent took aim at the majority’s methodology for two reasons:
first, the dissent accused the majority of conflating the first factor’s focus on the
function of the panel with the fourth factor’s focus on how the panel was created;
second, the dissent accused the majority of improperly turning to the FOAA’s
definition of public proceedings for guidance in interpreting public records.122 The
dissent said the Maine Legislature decoupled the term “public proceedings” from
“public records” and, that because the Law Court strictly construes all exceptions to
the FOAA, “these limitations do not control our interpretation of ‘public records’ and
the Court’s use of these exemptions to narrow the scope of ‘public records’ runs
contrary to both the statutory text and legislative intent.”123
For the second factor—whether the government funded the panel—the majority
and dissent agreed that the government did not fund the panel; therefore, this factor
weighed against finding the panel to be the functional equivalent of an agency.124
Essentially, the majority characterized the investigation as self-funded by Beaulieu,
Glazier, and Abbott, and said that they received only incidental logistical support.125
Addressing the government involvement and control factor, the majority
concluded the panel was free from government control because, beyond incidental
support, the Attorney General intentionally had no involvement in or control over the
investigation.126 The majority based its conclusion on its view that the facts showed
“no indication that the Attorney General made or attempted to make any effort to limit
the extent or scope of the investigation, its timing, its evidence development process,
the choices of persons to be interviewed, or any other aspect of the defendants’
activities.”127 Further, in the majority’s only allusion to the type of records the panel
compiled, the court said the incidental support by the Attorney General’s office
included copies of records that were already part of the public record.128
Disagreeing, the dissent said the panel acted within the scope of work delineated
by the Attorney General, so the factor should weigh in favor of finding that the panel
acted like an agency.129 Again, the dissent said the majority minimized certain facts:
that the panel had a narrow charge; that it did not release its report to the public, but
gave it to the Attorney General; and that its report “acknowledged the Attorney
General’s control over the scope of its investigation.”130 Further, the dissent turned to
Lewiston Daily Sun’s linkages test as a standard by which to measure the Attorney
General’s control over the panel.131 For example, the dissent said:

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. ¶¶ 27-28, 952 A.2d at 987.
Id. ¶ 28, 952 A.2d at 987.
See id. ¶ 17, 952 A.2d at 984 (majority opinion); id. ¶ 29, 952 A.2d at 987 (Levy, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 17, 952 A.2d at 984 (majority opinion).
Id. ¶ 18, 952 A.2d at 985.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 30, 952 A.2d at 987 (Levy, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶¶ 31-32, 952 A.2d at 987-88.
See id. ¶ 33, 952 A.2d at 988.
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As with the mayor in Lewiston Daily Sun, the Attorney General exercised no direct
control over the panel during the course of its investigation. He did, however,
exercise substantial control over the panel’s formation, its composition, its access to
departmental resources, the scope of its inquiry, and the distribution of its findings.
Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of a positive finding that the panel acted as a
public agency.132

For the fourth factor—whether the panel was created by private or legislative
action—the majority concluded there was no legislative mandate that created the
panel.133 Distinguishing this case from Lewiston Daily Sun, the majority said the facts
were different because here there was no “official legislative or executive
authorization,” while in Lewiston Daily Sun Auburn’s mayor, acting on the city
council’s direction, created the investigatory panel.134 While the majority adhered to
the binary categories of “private or legislative,” in dicta the opinion implied that it
would analyze this factor differently had there been an executive order “or other
official action creating this advisory group.”135 It is not clear what level of action by
the Attorney General would be sufficient for the majority to consider it “official” under
this analysis. Instead, the majority said, “all that existed was a letter from the Attorney
General requesting that the three attorneys conduct an independent investigation and
provide to him a nonbinding advisory report.”136 As a result, the majority said the
panel “was not created by legislative action or even by Executive Order to bring it
within the criteria we outlined.”137
In its most significant departure from the majority’s analysis, the dissent argued
for a broader test that looked to whether government—as opposed to merely legislative
action—created the panel.138 The dissent contended that this broader view of the fourth
factor is necessary because the FOAA’s scope extends beyond just legislative
creations; for example, turning to the definition for public proceedings, the FOAA
applies to advisory committees established by executive order, and requires many
public officials whose positions are not created by the legislature to undergo training
in the statute’s mechanics.139 Based on this analysis, the dissent concluded that the
Attorney General’s action creating the panel constituted an act of government: the
Attorney General, acting in his official capacity as a constitutional officer, “conceived
of the idea of an independent investigatory panel, appointed its members, delineated
the scope of its work, and provided it unfettered access to his staff.”140 Additionally,
the dissent noted that other jurisdictions using a similar functional equivalency analysis
characterized the fourth factor broadly in an effort to encompass all entities created by
government.141

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. ¶ 34, 952 A.2d at 988.
Id. ¶ 19, 952 A.2d at 985 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20, 952 A.2d at 985.
Id.
See id. ¶ 35, 952 A.2d at 988 (Levy, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 36, 952 A.2d at 989.
Id. ¶ 37, 952 A.2d at 989.
Id. ¶ 35, 952 A.2d at 988 (citing Conn. Humane Soc’y, 591 A.2d at 397; Telford, 974 P.2d at 893).
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While the majority concluded that all four factors weighed against finding that the
FOAA applied to the panel, the dissent, on balance, found that three of the four factors
supported a conclusion that the panel was an agency under the FOAA.142 Giving
greatest weight to the first factor, the dissent argued that it favored finding the panel
acted like an agency because the “power to prosecute rests exclusively with the State
and is a core function of sovereign authority;” hence, any investigation into the
exercise of that power is “necessarily a derivative expression of this unique
authority.”143 Moreover, the panel’s work “sprang directly from the Attorney General’s
exclusive responsibility for the ‘direction and control of all investigations and
prosecution of homicides.’”144 Therefore, the dissent concluded all records held by the
panel that would not otherwise be subject to an exception to the FOAA should be
disclosed.145
IV. JUST THE LAW PLEASE: DID DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FACTS LEAD
TO A DISAGREEMENT ON THE LAW?
A. First, the Facts
The majority and dissenting opinions had different interpretations of the facts and
how to weigh them, and their resulting characterizations led to different legal
conclusions. Notably, the factual disagreement led to a divergence over the application
of the first and third factors of the functional equivalency test: Were Abbott, Glazier,
and Beaulieu performing a function that is usually reserved to government? To what
extent did the government control their work? In a test based on functional
equivalency, these are arguably core questions.
For example, the majority and dissent appear to disagree over whether Abbott,
Glazier, and Beaulieu had access to the entire Dechaine file, including parts designated
confidential by the Maine Legislature, or simply parts of the file already available for
public inspection under Sen. Martin’s bill.146 Implicit in the majority’s characterization
of the file as “public” is a conclusion that the work of the panel was not truly an
investigation and also that it was free from the type of government control that would
be present when handling confidential files. In contrast, the dissent took great pains
to note that Rowe not only provided “the panel access to his entire file in the matter,
portions of which are explicitly designated confidential by the Legislature, but also
ordered the personnel involved in the Dechaine prosecution to cooperate in the panel’s
investigation.”147 The dissent’s focus on this characterization appears to be based on
a generalization that an investigation into confidential matters involving allegations
that the power to prosecute was abused, must be part of the sovereign’s exclusive
power to prosecute.

142. Id. ¶ 38, 952 A.2d at 989 (Levy, J., dissenting).
143. Id. ¶ 39, 952 A.2d at 989.
144. Id. (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 200-A (2002)).
145. Id. ¶ 40, 952 A.2d at 989.
146. Compare id. ¶ 18, 952 A.2d at 985 (majority opinion), with id. ¶ 25, 952 A.2d at 986 (Levy, J.,
dissenting).
147. Id. ¶ 25, 952 A.2d at 986 (Levy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added, citation omitted).
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Additionally, the dissent argued the majority minimized several facts. For
example, it noted that Rowe and his staff discussed whether there was a way to conduct
the review within state government and “eventually concluded there was not.”148
Further, the dissent pointed to Rowe’s charge to the panel: to conduct an “investigation
‘in order to ensure continued public confidence’ in the state’s law enforcement
agencies,” which the majority minimized when considering whether the panel
performed a governmental function.149 In contrast, when analyzing whether the panel
performed a governmental function, the majority focused on its perception of the
panel’s report as nonbinding and that there was “no authority to charge, prosecute, or
sanction any misconduct it might have found.”150
Lastly, when telling the factual and procedural story of this case, the majority and
dissent made different language choices when referring to Abbott, Glazier, and
Beaulieu, which provides insight into their legal conclusions.151 For example, the
majority repeatedly referred to Abbott, Glazier, and Beaulieu as “the three,” “[t]he
three attorneys,” “the three individuals,” and “the three private citizens.”152 By
peppering its opinion with these referential terms, the majority ignored the fact that the
three attorneys were asked to serve as a single group and ultimately created one work
product.153 In contrast, the dissent primarily referred to the attorneys as “the
investigatory panel,” “the panel,” and “the entity,” though there was one reference to
“three volunteers appointed by the Attorney General.”154 Rowe’s charging letter, as
well as the report ultimately issued, supports the dissent’s treatment of the individuals
as a group.155 Rowe’s letter asked “that you conduct an independent and impartial
review . . . and provide to me a report of your findings, which will be made public.”156
The Attorney General’s language referred to a single report, which implicitly suggested
that the three attorneys should work as a group. Additionally, the report provided to
Rowe supports this analysis. The introductory clause of the first sentence referred to
a singular “our report,” and the text made clear that there was a division of labor, with
members performing different tasks in the overall review—as opposed to three
individuals performing three independent reviews of the same material.157
The disagreements over these facts seemed to impact the analysis of the first and
third factors, whether the panel performed a government function and the extent of
government control or influence. Because of this disagreement, the Law Court would
have benefited by remanding to the Superior Court for further factual findings and an

148. Id.
149. Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 952 A.2d at 986-87 (quoting Rowe’s letter to the panel).
150. Id. ¶ 15, 952 A.2d at 984 (majority opinion).
151. The same observation might be made about this Note.
152. See, e.g., Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶¶ 3-6, 15, 952 A.2d at 982-84. While the majority did use “the
group” and “the informal advisory group,” it was qualified in the next paragraph with “the individuals
provided collective advice.” See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 12-13, 952 A.2d at 983-84.
153. See Appendix to Brief of Appellant at pt. 6, Moore, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980 (No. CUM-07467).
154. Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶¶ 22-27, 39, 952 A.2d at 985-87, 989 (Levy, J., dissenting).
155. See Appendix to Brief of Appellant at pts. 6, 8, Moore, 2008 ME 100, 952 A.2d 980 (No. CUM-07467).
156. Id. at pt. 6.
157. Id. at pt. 8.
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in-camera review of the documents in question. An in-camera review would have
provided insight into the underlying question of what records, if any, the panel created
and maintained and how those records differed from any records Moore previously
obtained. Presumably, reviewing the panel’s records also would have deepened the
court’s understanding of the function the panel performed and cleared up an
inconsistency that remains: Did the panel have access to the entire file or only those
portions already in the public domain?
B. Then, the Law
There are two significant differences between the majority and dissenting
opinions’ view of the law in Moore. First, the majority opinion ignored the possibility
of using Lewiston Daily Sun’s linkages analysis as a lens through which to analyze the
third factor of government control; instead, the majority distinguished the case as
inapplicable to its analysis of the fourth factor dealing with how the panel was created,
based on a view that the city council’s authorization in Lewiston Daily Sun was
tantamount to legislative action.158 Second, the majority rigidly applied the fourth
factor, which looked to how the panel was created, and failed to recognize that the
functional equivalency test, as a judicial construct, served as a flexible gap-filler where
the FOAA was silent. As a result, the dissent’s analysis of the law in Moore did a
better job of effectuating the Maine Legislature’s intent to favor disclosure and
openness. Therefore, the Law Court should revisit the functional equivalency test in
the future to adopt the dissent’s version of the law.
First, by using the linkages analysis from Lewiston Daily Sun as a proxy for the
government control factor, the dissent successfully avoided conflicting precedent that
may cause confusion for municipal officials. Already, one member of the legal
community has cautioned municipal officials to err on the side of caution and to
assume that an advisory panel similar to the one in Moore will be subject to the
FOAA’s disclosure requirements, based on Lewiston Daily Sun, which the court did
not overrule.159 Although it is possible to distinguish Lewiston Daily Sun in the context
of the fourth factor, based on the fact that the city council authorized Auburn’s mayor
to create an outside investigatory panel, the similarities are more apparent, as the
dissent persuasively argued. The dissent’s argument reconciled the two cases
successfully by using the linkages analysis as a lens through which to examine the
extent of government control and involvement. In comparing the facts in Moore with
Lewiston Daily Sun, the dissent said:
As with the mayor in Lewiston Daily Sun, the Attorney General exercised no direct
control over the panel during the course of its investigation. He did, however,
exercise substantial control over the panel’s formation, its composition, its access to
departmental resources, the scope of its inquiry, and the distribution of its findings.160

158. See Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶ 19, 952 A.2d at 985 (majority opinion).
159. Amanda A. Meader, Maine Supreme Court Rules on Definition of Public Official, http://www.
bernsteinshur.com/files-publications/Bernstein%20Shur%20Advisory_Maine%20Definition%
20of%20Public%20Official.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
160. Moore, 2008 ME 100, ¶ 34, 952 A.2d at 988.
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Accordingly, the dissent concluded this factor weighed heavily in favor of concluding
that the panel acted as a public agency and, in so doing, provided a point of
comparison for future cases.161
Second, the majority’s adherence to prior iterations of the four factors led it to a
conclusion that runs counter to the Maine Legislature’s intent that government business
be conducted openly, which is why the legislature directed the courts to construe the
FOAA liberally.162 When the functional equivalency test was first used, the Law Court
characterized the fourth factor as whether legislative or private action created a
hospital district, which represented a narrower view of the test than in other
jurisdictions.163 However, the court did so in a decision that ultimately favored
disclosure, in part, because the legislature created the hospital district.164 Nowhere in
that decision is there any language implying that the fourth factor should be used so
narrowly in the future; rather, the opinion said that an entity need not strictly conform
to each factor and that each should be weighed.165 In contrast, the majority’s strict
adherence to this earlier iteration of the functional equivalency test ignores its inherent
flexibility as a tool to effectuate the Maine Legislature’s policy and elevates the court’s
policy judgment—that legislative authorization is a necessary condition to determine
whether an entity is the functional equivalent of a government agency—above the
legislature’s policy favoring openness. This was especially true in Moore, given that
the Attorney General, a constitutional officer with broad powers to do what is
necessary to protect the public interest, created the panel in an effort to protect the
reputation of Maine’s law enforcement community. Here, investigating whether there
was misconduct by law enforcement officers or prosecutors, which would have either
put rumors to rest or likely resulted in further action, protected the public’s interest in
ensuring its law enforcement officers and prosecutors obeyed the law. The majority’s
narrow view of this factor unduly restricted the public’s access to information at the
expense of the Attorney General’s power.
C. A Roadmap for the Future
Going forward, there are two steps the Law Court should consider. First, the Law
Court should adopt the dissent’s view of the functional equivalency test because, as
already noted, it does a better job of meeting the legislature’s intent to favor disclosure
and openness while also reconciling Lewiston Daily Sun. Second, the Law Court
should consider changing its process for cases like this one, where there is a
disagreement over the facts. In the future, the court should consider remanding for
further factual findings and an in-camera inspection of the records being sought. An
in-camera inspection is not a panacea; however, it would have provided insight into
what records, if any, the panel created, maintained, or obtained, and how they differ
from those Moore previously obtained. Doing so would have provided a window into
the panel’s function and the amount of control the Attorney General exercised.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 (1989 & Supp. 2008).
Town of Burlington, 2001 ME 59, ¶ 16, 769 A.2d at 862-63.
Id. ¶ 17, 769 A.2d at 863.
Id. ¶ 16, 769 A.2d at 863.
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Additionally, it would have cleared up factual differences between the majority and
dissent, which may have resulted in an opinion that, if not in agreement on what the
law should be, would have at least applied the different versions of the law to the same
set of facts. Although unanimity should not be a goal unto itself, Maine citizens
benefit from clear decisions based on a uniform understanding of the facts.
V. TWO LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
A. Overview
The results of Moore call for a legislative solution because the Law Court’s
analysis yielded a result that is contrary to the Maine Legislature’s intent to foster
openness and disclosure of records. There are many possible ways to address the
situation. However, two options are presented here; the first would address the
situation narrowly by placing the burden for litigation on the state, and the second
would address the situation more broadly by addressing the underlying status of the
records of advisory panels. An amendment to the FOAA’s definition of public
proceedings is included to maintain parity in the treatment of public records and public
proceedings, to avoid a result similar to Moore with regard to public proceedings.
B. The Narrow Option
A narrow solution tailored to the facts of Moore would require advisory panels
created for a limited period to turn over all records—whether created, obtained, or
maintained—to the charging agency at the conclusion of its work. The purpose behind
such an amendment would be to place the burden of responding to public records
requests on the appropriate agency of state or local government that created the entity.
In Moore, that would have meant all records of the panel would have been turned over
to the Attorney General’s Office, which would have then been responsible for
responding to Moore’s request and litigating the issues. For example, an amendment
to the FOAA’s definition of public records could include:
3-B. Public records further defined. "Public records" also includes the records of any
advisory organization, including any authority, board, commission, committee,
council, task force, or similar organization of an advisory nature, established,
authorized or organized by law or resolve or by Executive Order issued by the
Governor, or by the action of a constitutional officer once the advisory organization’s
work has concluded and the records have been turned over to the agency or official
that created the advisory organization. All records created, maintained, or obtained
by an advisory organization shall be turned over to the agency or official that created
the advisory organization within 30 days of the completion of its work.

Of course, “agency or official” could be substituted for “constitutional officer” to
achieve a broader effect. This leaves the courts to consider whether the records should
be subject to disclosure during the panel’s work.
C. The Broad Option
A broader solution would amend the definition of public records to include the
records of any advisory entity, whether created by the Maine Legislature, Governor,
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or a constitutional officer, such as the Attorney General. The purpose would be to
bring the records of advisory groups such as the one in Moore under the ambit of the
FOAA. An amended definition of public records could include:
3-B. Public records further defined. “Public records” also includes the records of any
advisory organization created by law, resolve, Executive Order issued by the
Governor, or by the action of a constitutional officer, unless the law resolve, executive
order, or official action by a constitutional officer creating the entity specifically
exempts the organization from the application of this subchapter or the records are
otherwise confidential under this subchapter.166

For a broader impact, “agency or official” could be substituted for “constitutional
officer.” This solution could be further refined by the Maine Legislature—or
ultimately through judicial interpretation—to determine whether the official action
exempting the organization from the application of the FOAA is appropriate in a given
situation.
In tandem with an amendment to the definition of public records, the Maine
Legislature should consider amending the definition of public proceedings to clarify
whether a panel such as the one at issue in Moore would be required to hold its
meetings in public. The advantage to doing so would be in keeping parity between the
public’s access to records as well as meetings; however, there may be some advisory
entities that perform work best done in private. Accordingly, an amendment to the
definition of pubic proceedings also allowing for confidentiality would be most useful.
For example, an amendment could say “public proceedings” means the business of:
F. Any advisory organization, including any authority, board, commission,
committee, council, task force or similar organization of an advisory nature,
established, authorized or organized by law or resolve or by Executive Order issued
by the Governor or by the action of a constitutional officer and not otherwise covered
by this subsection, unless the law, resolve or Executive Order or official action
establishing, authorizing or organizing the advisory organization specifically exempts
the organization from the application of this subchapter.

However, this amendment probably should not stand on its own without a
corresponding change to the public records definitions. Otherwise, there would be an
imbalance by opening meetings of such groups to the public, but leaving the courts to
decide whether their records are confidential.

166. Maine’s Right to Know Advisory Committee, a legislatively created panel convened to examine
public records exceptions and regularly review the FOAA, considered three legislative options in response
to Moore. Right to Know Advisory Committee, Draft Meeting Summary (Nov. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/RTKSummaryfor11-17-08.pdf. Ultimately, the Committee declined to
make a formal recommendation to the Maine Legislature. See Right to Know Advisory Committee, Third
Annual Report of the Right to Know Advisory Committee (January 2009), available at
http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/rtkrept2009.pdf. However, the Committee considered language similar
to what I have proposed, as well as language that would have codified the dissent’s version of the four
factors. Right to Know Advisory Committee, Draft Meeting Summary (Sept. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/rtksummary%20for91008.pdf. The draft minutes of the meeting indicate
that Attorney General Rowe supported the proposal considered by the Committee that is similar to the one
proposed in this Note. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, in Moore, the Law Court rendered a decision that restricts access to
records of an entity performing an independent review of a law enforcement
investigation and prosecution. The majority, by applying a narrow version of the law
to its view of the facts, concluded the FOAA did not make the records of the
investigatory panel public. In contrast, the dissent took a broader view of the
applicable law to reach a decision that favors disclosure. Given that the Maine
Legislature clearly stated its intent that the FOAA be liberally construed, the majority
decision appears to be at odds with the legislature’s direction, especially considering
that the functional equivalency test need not be construed so narrowly as to only apply
to legislatively created entities when the FOAA applies more broadly.
As a result, this Note makes three recommendations. First, when faced with
factual disagreements in a public records case, as here, the Law Court should consider
remanding for further factual findings and an in-camera inspection. Doing so would
ensure the facts are sufficiently developed and also may lead to fewer split decisions.
Second, the Law Court should revisit the functional equivalency test to adopt the
dissent’s broader view of the fourth factor, so that entities created by government, as
opposed to solely by the legislative action, are subject to the FOAA’s disclosure
requirements. This would better effectuate the Maine Legislature’s intent that the
business of Maine’s governments be open. Third, the Maine Legislature should amend
the FOAA’s definition of public records either to require that advisory panels turn their
records over to the appropriate charging agency, or to include as public records the
records of advisory panels created by the Maine Legislature, Governor, or a
constitutional officer. Doing so would ensure that the burden for litigation is placed
on the state or appropriate charging agency, as opposed to citizens who have
volunteered to serve their cities, counties, or state in an advisory capacity. Otherwise,
citizens who volunteer will bear a significant risk of being sued, which could be a
disincentive to this type of public service.

